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Abstract
A cancelable biometric scheme called correlation-invariant random fil-
tering (CIRF) is known as a promising template protection scheme. This
scheme transforms a biometric feature represented as an image via the
2D number theoretic transform (NTT) and random filtering. CIRF has
perfect secrecy in that the transformed feature leaks no information about
the original feature. However, CIRF cannot be applied to large-scale bio-
metric identification, since the 2D inverse NTT in the matching phase
requires high computational time. Furthermore, existing biometric in-
dexing schemes cannot be used in conjunction with template protection
schemes to speed up biometric identification, since a biometric index leaks
some information about the original feature. In this paper, we propose
a novel indexing scheme called “cancelable indexing” to speed up CIRF
without losing its security properties. The proposed scheme is based on
fast computation of CIRF via low-rank approximation of biometric im-
ages and via a minimum spanning tree representation of low-rank matri-
ces in the Fourier domain. We prove that the transformed index leaks no
information about the original index and the original biometric feature
(i.e., perfect secrecy), and thoroughly discuss the security of the proposed
scheme. We also demonstrate that it significantly reduces the one-to-many
matching time using a finger-vein dataset that includes six fingers from
505 subjects.
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1 Introduction
Biometric authentication systems, which recognize a person based on physical
characteristics (e.g., fingerprint, finger-vein, iris) or behavioral characteristics
(e.g., voice, gait), have been used for various applications (e.g., PC login, phys-
ical access control, banking). They are also expected to be applied to user
authentication over networks (e.g., internet banking, online payment, member-
ship authentication), where a client sends a biometric sample (referred to as a
query sample) to a server for authentication, and the server compares it with a
biometric feature enrolled in a database (referred to as a template).
However, the use of biometric authentication over networks raises severe
security concerns. Specifically, since biometric features (e.g., fingerprint, finger-
vein, iris) are unchangeable, they cannot be revoked (unlike passwords or to-
kens) if they are leaked from the server. A naive way to prevent the leakage
of biometric features is to encrypt the features using a conventional encryp-
tion scheme such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). However, since
the encrypted features have to be decrypted to perform pattern matching on
the server, a skilled attacker aiming at the timing of decryption can obtain the
original features.
Template protection schemes [16], which keep biometric features secret even
during the matching phase, have been widely studied to address this issue. They
can be divided into two approaches: cancelable biometrics (a.k.a. feature trans-
formation) [34, 38, 40, 39, 46] and biometric cryptosystems [11, 12, 22, 26].
Among them, a cancelable biometric scheme called correlation-invariant ran-
dom filtering (CIRF) [38, 40, 39] is known as a promising template protection
scheme. CIRF transforms biometric features via the 2D number theoretic trans-
form (NTT) and random filtering. Then it performs pattern matching without
restoring the original features by multiplying the transformed template by the
transformed query sample and transforming the result via the 2D inverse NTT
(see Section 2.4 for details). CIRF can be applied to any kind of biometric
traits whose score (distance or similarity) is measured via cross-correlation be-
tween biometric features (e.g., fingerprint [14], face [4], iris [9], finger-vein [25])
without affecting accuracy. In addition, it is proved in [40, 39] that CIRF has
perfect secrecy. Specifically, according to [5], a cryptosystem has perfect secrecy
if any ciphertext c ∈ C (C: ciphertext space) provides no information about
the plaintext m ∈ P (P: plaintext space); i.e., Pr(m|c) = Pr(m) for any m ∈ P
and any c ∈ C. Similarly, it is proved in [40, 39] that in CIRF, the transformed
template T ∈ T (T: space of transformed templates) provides no informa-
tion about the original template X ∈ X (X: space of original templates); i.e.,
Pr(X |T ) = Pr(X) for any X ∈ X and any T ∈ T.
However, CIRF cannot be applied to a large-scale biometric identification
system because of its high computational time during the matching phase. More
specifically, biometric authentication can operate in either of the following two
modes: verification and identification [2]. In the verification mode, a user claims
an identity (i.e., enters an ID number or presents a smart card) and inputs
his/her query sample. Then the system compares the query sample with a
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template corresponding to the claimed identity (i.e., one-to-one matching). In
the identification mode, a user inputs only his/her query sample. Then the
system compares the query sample with many templates in the database (i.e.,
one-to-many matching). Based on the scores, the system identifies the user (e.g.,
if the system finds a template whose distance falls below a threshold, it identifies
the user as the corresponding enrollee; if there is no such template, it rejects the
user). Biometric identification offers a more convenient way of authentication,
since a user need not enter an ID number or present a smart card. However, the
response time can be very long in large-scale biometric identification, since the
one-to-many matching time increases in proportion to the number of templates.
This problem is particularly severe for CIRF, since the 2D inverse NTT in the
matching phase requires a number of 1D inverse NTTs, which involve high
computational time. For example, in our experiments in Section 4, it took 0.28
ms to compute a score between two biometric features based on CIRF. This
means that it takes about 9 (≈ 0.28× 10−3 × 32000) seconds to identify a user
when the number of templates in the database is 32000.
A biometric indexing (or classification) scheme [21, 23] has been widely stud-
ied to speed up biometric identification (see Section 1.1 for details). It computes,
for each biometric feature, an index, which is a simple representation of the
biometric feature (e.g., binary string, vector). In the identification phase, it
typically computes an approximate score (distance or similarity) for each tem-
plate using the index. In this paper, we refer to this process as an approximate
matching. After the approximate matching, it sorts templates in ascending (or
descending) order of the approximate distance (or similarity) and computes an
“exact” score for a template according to the sorted order (e.g., if the exact
distance falls below a threshold, identify the user as the corresponding enrollee;
otherwise, continue to the next template). Since the index is a simple represen-
tation of the biometric feature, the approximate score is efficiently computed
and is highly correlated with an exact score. Therefore, a genuine template can
be found in the early stage of exact matching. Consequently, the number of
exact score computations can be significantly reduced.
It should be noted, however, that a biometric index leaks some information
about the original biometric feature, since it is a simple representation of a bio-
metric feature. Therefore, a biometric index needs to be protected in the same
way as a biometric feature when it is used to speed up biometric identification
over networks. In the following, we review previous work related to this issue.
1.1 Related Work
Biometric indexing schemes have been widely studied in the literature (a survey
of them can be found in [21, 23]). They are recently studied for various kinds
of biometric traits; e.g., fingerprint [7, 37, 45], iris [10, 30, 33], and finger-vein
[18, 32, 42]. However, most existing biometric indexing schemes do not protect
a biometric index, and cannot be securely used for biometric identification over
networks. Some studies [12, 17, 20, 44, 49] proposed an indexing (or hashing)
scheme that transforms or encrypts an index (or hash) and performs a query
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search without recovering the original index (or hash). However, these schemes
do not guarantee that the transformed index leaks no information about the
original index (i.e., perfect secrecy). As a different approach, a filtering tech-
nique for biometric identification based on secure multiparty computation was
proposed in [3]. In this approach, however, the original templates are stored in
the server, and can be leaked by illegal access or by internal fraud.
1.2 Our contributions
In this paper, we propose a novel indexing scheme called cancelable indexing to
speed up CIRF without losing its security properties. The proposed indexing
scheme has perfect secrecy in that the transformed index leaks no information
about the original biometric feature. To our knowledge, the proposed indexing
scheme is the first to have such perfect secrecy. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a cancelable indexing scheme based on fast computation of
CIRF via low-rank approximation of biometric images and via a minimum
spanning tree representation of low-rank matrices in the Fourier domain.
We prove that the proposed indexing scheme computes a cross-correlation
between two approximated biometric images with much less 1D inverse
NTTs (Section 3.4, Theorem 1).
• We then prove that the transformed index leaks no information about the
original biometric feature and the original index (Section 3.4, Theorem
2). To our knowledge, the proposed indexing scheme is the first to have
such perfect secrecy. Based on this property, we thoroughly discuss the
security of the proposed scheme.
• We evaluate the proposed scheme using the finger-vein dataset in [47],
which includes six fingers from 505 subjects. Our experimental results
show that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the one-to-many
matching time. For example, the proposed scheme requires only about
one second on average when the number of templates is 32000 (whereas it
takes about 9 seconds to compute exact scores for all of the templates).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe details of cancelable biometrics and CIRF [38, 40, 39].
We first explain an overview of cancelable biometrics in the case of verification
and identification in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. We then describe de-
sirable properties for cancelable biometrics in Section 2.3. We finally explain
details of CIRF in Section 2.4.
2.1 Cancelable biometrics for verification
Fig. 1 shows an overview of cancelable biometrics in the case of biometric ver-
ification. Let X, Y, R, T, and V be spaces of templates, query samples, pa-
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rameters, transformed templates, and transformed query samples, respectively.
We denote a template, query sample, parameter, transformed template, and
transformed query sample by X ∈ X, Y ∈ Y, R ∈ R, T ∈ T, and V ∈ V,
respectively. In the enrollment phase, a template X is transformed via a trans-
formation function FR : X→ T, which is dependent on a parameter R, and the
transformed template T = FR(X) is stored in an authentication server. The
parameter R is uniformly randomly generated, and plays a role similar to an
encryption key. The parameter R can be stored in a client or a parameter man-
agement server [41], which is administered separately from the authentication
server.
In the authentication phase, a query sample Y is transformed via a transfor-
mation function GR : Y → V, which is dependent on the parameter R, and the
transformed query sample V = GR(Y ) is sent to the authentication server. The
authentication server compares V (= GR(Y )) with the transformed template
T (= FR(X)). Let R be the set of real numbers, and s : X × Y → R be an
exact score function that takes input a template X and a query sample Y and
outputs an exact score (distance or similarity) s(X,Y ) ∈ R between X and Y .
The authentication server computes an exact score s(X,Y ) by comparing V
with T without restoring X and Y . If the distance (resp. similarity) s(X,Y ) is
smaller (resp. larger) than a pre-determined threshold, the authentication server
accepts the user (otherwise, it rejects the user). The transformation function FR
is designed so that the original biometric feature X cannot be recovered from
the transformed template FR(X). Therefore, even if FR(X) or R is leaked, they
can be revoked by generating a new parameter Rnew and replacing FR(X) with
a new transformed template FRnew(X). Similarly, GR is designed so that Y
cannot be recovered from GR(Y ).
Note that the original template X can be recovered from FR(X) and R, if FR
is a bijective (one-to-one) function. Even if FR is a many-to-one function, it is
possible to recoverX from FR(X) and R, as shown in [28, 31]. Therefore, if both
FR(X) and R are leaked,X can be recovered from them. It is important to note,
however, that if the parameter R is managed separately from the transformed
template FR(X) (e.g., R is stored in the client or the parameter management
server [41]), the risk of simultaneous leakage of FR(X) and R can be significantly
reduced. If we store R in a client that can be accessed by any user (e.g., ATM,
POS, kiosk terminal), there might be a high risk that R is leaked from the
client. Thus, a more secure way would be to use a parameter management server
[41]. In this model, a parameter management server securely manages R. The
parameter management server and the authentication server are administered
separately by different administrators or organizations, and they do not collude
with each other. Since users cannot access the parameter management server,
the risk of the leakage of R is much smaller (for details of the authentication
protocol in this model, see [41]).
Separate and secure management and periodic revocation of FR(X) and R
play important roles in protecting templates.
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Figure 1: Overview of cancelable biometrics (X : template, Y : query sample,
R: parameter, T : transformed template, V : transformed query sample).
2.2 Cancelable biometrics for identification
We now explain cancelable biometrics in the case of biometric identification.
Let N be the set of natural numbers, N ∈ N be the number of templates,
X(n) ∈ X be the n-th template, and T (n) ∈ T be the n-th transformed template
(1 ≤ n ≤ N). Let further R(n) ∈ R be a parameter for the n-th template X(n).
Regarding parameters R(1), · · · , R(N), we consider the following two scenarios:
(i) R(1), · · · , R(N) are independently and uniformly generated (i.e., a parameter
is different from template to template); (ii) a common parameter R∗ (= R(1) =
· · · = R(N)), which is uniformly generated, is used for all templates. We refer
to the former scenario as an individual parameter scenario, and the latter as a
common parameter scenario.
In the individual parameter scenario, the n-th template X(n) is transformed
using the n-th parameter R(n): T (n) = FR(n)(X
(n)) (1 ≤ n ≤ N). If we
store all parameters R(1), · · · , R(N) in the client, the client transforms a query
sample Y using each of R(1), · · · , R(N) in the authentication phase. Let V (n) =
GR(n)(Y ) ∈ V be the n-th transformed query sample. The client sends N
transformed query samples V (1), · · · , V (N) to the authentication server. Then
the authentication server computes a score between V (n) (= GR(n)(Y )) and T
(n)
(= FR(n)(X
(n))) (1 ≤ n ≤ N). In this case, the communication cost between the
client and the authentication server is proportional to N . Similarly, if we store
R(1), · · · , R(N) in the parameter management server [41], the communication
cost between the parameter management server and the authentication server
is proportional to N .
The common parameter scenario is much more efficient in terms of the com-
munication cost. In this case, the n-th template X(n) is transformed using a
common parameter R∗: T (n) = FR∗(X
(n)) (1 ≤ n ≤ N). At the authentica-
tion phase, we only have to transform a query sample Y using R∗ and send
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the transformed query sample V ∗ = GR∗(Y ) ∈ V to the authentication server.
Then the authentication server computes a score between V ∗ (= GR∗(Y )) and
T (n) (= FR∗(X
(n))). In this case, the communication cost does not depend
on N . However, since we use the same parameter R∗ for all templates in this
case, we need to thoroughly discuss its security. In this paper, we propose a
cancelable indexing scheme for both the individual parameter scenario and the
common parameter scenario, and thoroughly discuss the communication cost
and the security in both cases in Section 3.4.
2.3 Desirable properties for cancelable biometrics
An ideal cancelable biometric system should have the following properties [15,
16]:
(i) Security (irreversibility): It should be impossible or computationally
hard to recover the original biometric feature from the transformed fea-
ture.
(ii) Diversity (unlinkability): The transformed feature should not allow
cross-matching across databases.
(iii) Revocability: It should be straightforward to revoke a compromised
template and reissue a new one based on the same biometric data.
(iv) Accuracy: FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection
Rate) should not be degraded by transforming biometric features.
In biometric identification, an ideal cancelable biometric system should also
have the following property:
(v) Response time: The one-to-many matching time should be small (e.g.,
one second).
Regarding the security (irreversibility) in biometric identification, we con-
sider attackers of the following three types:
• Attacker A who obtains one transformed template, which corresponds
to the n-th template X(n).
• Attacker B who obtains N transformed templates, which corresponds to
the templates X(1), · · · , X(N).
• Attacker C who obtains all transformed features, which corresponds to
the templates X(1), · · · , X(N) and the query sample Y .
Typically, Attackers A and B are outsiders who obtain the transformed tem-
plate(s) leaked from the authentication server (i.e., external attackers), whereas
Attacker C is a malicious server (i.e., internal attacker). For the cancelable
indexing scheme proposed in Section 3, we assume that these attackers obtain
transformed indexes in addition to transformed features.
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Figure 2: Template X , query sample Y , and parameter R in CIRF.
2.4 Correlation-invariant Random Filtering (CIRF)
We describe an algorithm for CIRF [38, 40, 39] in biometric verification (we can
extend it to biometric identification, as described in Section 2.2).
We assume that a biometric feature is represented as an image with h
(height) × w (width) pixels (as shown in Fig. 2), and each pixel value is a
nonnegative integer less than p (p is a sufficiently large prime, which is de-
scribed later in detail). Let Zp be the set of nonnegative integers less than p;
i.e., Zp = {0, 1, · · · , p − 1}. Then, a template and a query sample can be ex-
pressed as X ∈ Zh×wp and Y ∈ Z
h×w
p , respectively; i.e., X = Y = Z
h×w
p . Let
X [i, j] and Y [i, j] (0 ≤ i < h, 0 ≤ j < w) be the (i, j)-th pixel of X and Y ,
respectively. We assume that an exact score s(X,Y ) ∈ R between X and Y is
computed using cyclic cross-correlation X ⋆ Y :
(X ⋆ Y )[∆i,∆j] =
h−1∑
i=0
w−1∑
j=0
X [i, j]Y [i+∆i mod h, j +∆j mod w]
(−∆imax ≤ ∆i ≤ ∆imax,−∆jmax ≤ ∆j ≤ ∆jmax), (1)
where ∆imax (< h) and ∆jmax (< w) are maximum allowable shift lengths
betweenX and Y . X⋆Y can also be expressed as cyclic convolutionX∗
←−
Y , where
←−
Y denotes a flipped image of Y :
←−
Y [i, j] = Y [h− i− 1, w − j − 1]. Since linear
cross-correlation can be computed using cyclic cross-correlation with the help
of zero-padding, this assumption is valid for any kind of biometric traits whose
score s(X,Y ) is measured via linear cross-correlation [4, 9, 14, 25]. Examples
of such scores include the minimum of the Hamming distances of overlapped
binary images over all values of ∆i and ∆j (see A for details).
CIRF transforms a template X via the 2D number theoretic transform
(NTT) F : Zh×wp → Z
h×w
p , a kind of 2D discrete Fourier transform (DFT)
over the Galois field Zp:
F(X)[u, v] =
h−1∑
i=0
w−1∑
j=0
αuiβvjX [i, j] mod p. (2)
α, β ∈ Zp are elements of the Galois field Zp whose orders are h and w, respec-
tively. p is a prime that satisfies
h | p− 1 and w | p− 1 (3)
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(i.e., h and w divide p− 1), and is larger than the maximum of the cyclic cross-
correlation between two biometric features [40]. Hereinafter, we assume that all
numerical operations are performed over Zp, and omit the notation “mod p”.
After computing F(X), CIRF computes F(X) ◦R, where ◦ denotes a pixel-
wise multiplication (i.e., Hadamard product) and R is a parameter (random
filter) uniformly randomly generated from (Z∗p)
h×w (Z∗p = Zp \ {0}). In other
words, the space of parameters is R = (Z∗p)
h×w. As for the query sample Y ,
CIRF computes F(
←−
Y ) ◦ R−1, where R−1 denotes a pixel-wise inverse of R.
Thus, the transformed template T and the transformed query sample V are
T = FR(X) = F(X) ◦ R and V = GR(Y ) = F(
←−
Y ) ◦ R−1, respectively, and
T = V = Zh×wp .
In the matching phase, CIRF computes F−1(T ◦ V ) (F−1 is the 2D inverse
NTT), which can be written as follows:
F−1(T ◦ V ) = F−1((F(X) ◦R) ◦ (F(
←−
Y ) ◦R−1)) (4)
= F−1(F(X) ◦ F(
←−
Y )) = X ∗
←−
Y = X ⋆ Y (5)
In other words, CIRF computes cross-correlation X ⋆ Y without restoring the
original biometric features X and Y . Therefore, CIRF can be applied to any
kind of biometric traits whose score is measured via X ⋆ Y without affecting
accuracy.
It is proved that the transformed template T leaks no information about
the original template X : Pr(X |T ) = Pr(X) for any X ∈ Zh×wp and any T ∈
Z
h×w
p (i.e., perfect secrecy) [40, 39]. Similarly, V leaks no information about Y :
Pr(Y |V ) = Pr(Y ) for any Y ∈ Zh×wp and any V ∈ Z
h×w
p . If the transformed
template T or the parameter R is leaked, they can be revoked by generating a
new parameter Rnew and issuing a new transformed template Tnew as follows:
Tnew = T ◦ (Rnew ◦R
−1) [40].
In addition, it is proved that two transformed templates T1 = FR1(X) and
T2 = FR2(X) generated from the same biometric feature X are independent:
Pr(T1|T2) = Pr(T1) if R1 and R2 are independently and uniformly generated
[40]. Therefore, the attacker cannot perform cross-matching across databases.
In summary, CIRF is a promising scheme with regard to the properties (i),
(ii), (iii), and (iv) in Section 2.3.
3 Cancelable indexing based on Low-rank Ap-
proximation of CIRF
A major shortcoming of CIRF is that it cannot be applied to a large-scale
biometric identification because of high computational cost in the matching
phase (i.e., it does not have the property (v) in Section 2.3). In particular, the
2D inverse NTT of T ◦V requires high computational cost (we confirmed that the
time to compute the 2D inverse NTT accounts for most of the matching time).
The 2D inverse NTT of T ◦ V requires h + w separate 1D inverse NTTs, even
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Figure 3: Approximated biometric images Xˆ(n) and Yˆ and the cross-correlation
Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ . Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ can be computed via a small number of 1D inverse NTTs.
with the aid of the row-column algorithm. Therefore, we propose a cancelable
indexing scheme that significantly reduces the number of the 1D inverse NTTs.
We first explain an overview of the proposed indexing scheme in Section 3.1.
We then describe an algorithm for the proposed indexing scheme in Sections 3.2
and 3.3. We finally explain its theoretical properties in Section 3.4.
3.1 Overview
We begin by briefly explaining an overview of the proposed indexing scheme.
Let N ∈ N be the number of transformed template stored in an authentication
server, X(n) ∈ Zh×wp (1 ≤ n ≤ N) be the n-th template, and Y ∈ Z
h×w
p be a
query sample.
The proposed indexing scheme is based on our findings that the number
of the 1D inverse NTTs in CIRF can be significantly reduced by approximat-
ing biometric images by low-rank matrices. Specifically, the proposed scheme
approximates X(n) and Y by low-rank matrices Xˆ(n) and Yˆ , respectively, and
factorizes each of them into small matrices using matrix factorization [8, 35, 50].
Then it uses small matrices computed from Xˆ(n) and Yˆ as indexes of Xˆ(n) and
Yˆ , respectively. The proposed scheme performs pattern matching for the indexes
in an analogous way to CIRF. More specifically, it transforms the indexes via
the 1D NTT and random filtering, and computes the cross-correlation Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ
from the transformed indexes (without restoring the original indexes) via a small
number of 1D inverse NTTs. Fig. 3 shows Xˆ(n), Yˆ , and Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ (Xˆ
(n)
α , Xˆ
(n)
β ,
Yˆα, and Yˆβ are small matrices, which are described in detail in Section 3.2).
It should be noted that since Xˆ(n) and Yˆ approximate X(n) and Y , re-
spectively, Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ also approximates X(n) ⋆ Y . Let sˆ : X × Y → R be an
approximate score function that takes input X(n) and Y and outputs an ap-
proximate score (distance or similarity) sˆ(X(n), Y ) ∈ R between X(n) and Y .
The proposed scheme computes an approximate score sˆ(X(n), Y ) using Xˆ(n)⋆Yˆ ,
and sorts N transformed templates in ascending (or descending) order of the ap-
proximate distance (or similarity) sˆ(X(n), Y ). Then it computes an exact score
s(X(n), Y ) according to the sorted order. Since sˆ(X(n), Y ) is highly correlated
with s(X(n), Y ), a genuine template can be found in the early stage of exact
matching.
The proposed indexing scheme can be applied to any kind of biometric traits
whose score is measured via cross-correlation. In this paper, we use CIRF to
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compute an exact score, since it is promising with regard to the properties (i),
(ii), (iii), and (iv).
3.2 Algorithm
We now describe details of the proposed indexing scheme. We regard the n-th
template X(n) and the query sample Y as rank-k matrices with very small k
(k ≪ min{h,w}; in our experiments, k = 1 or 2), and approximate them as
follows:
Xˆ(n) = X(n)α X
(n)T
β =
k∑
i=1
x
(n)
αi x
(n)T
βi (6)
Yˆ = YαY
T
β =
k∑
i=1
yαiy
T
βi (7)
where Xˆ(n) ∈ Zh×wp , Yˆ ∈ Z
h×w
p , X
(n)
α , Yα ∈ Z
h×k
p , X
(n)
β , Yβ ∈ Z
w×k
p , x
(n)
αi , yαi ∈
Z
h
p , and x
(n)
βi , yβi ∈ Z
w
p .
We define X
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N) and Yidx as follows:
X
(n)
idx = {X
(n)
α , X
(n)
β } = {x
(n)
αi , x
(n)
βi |1 ≤ i ≤ k} (8)
Yidx = {Yα, Yβ} = {y
(n)
αi , y
(n)
βi |1 ≤ i ≤ k}, (9)
and use them as an index ofX(n) and Y , respectively. To computeX
(n)
idx and Yidx
from X(n) and Y , we use a matrix factorization method such as NMF (Non-
negative Matrix Factorization) [8] and BMF (Boolean Matrix Factorization)
[35, 50].
We use
R
(n)
idx = {R
(n)
α , R
(n)
β } = {r
(n)
αi , r
(n)
βi |1 ≤ i ≤ k} (10)
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(R
(n)
α ∈ (Z∗p)
h×k, R
(n)
β ∈ (Z
∗
p)
w×k, r
(n)
αi ∈ (Z
∗
p)
h, r
(n)
βi ∈ (Z
∗
p)
w; r
(n)
αi and r
(n)
βi are
random vectors) as a parameter (random filter) for the index X
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N).
For the first index X
(1)
idx, we also use
R′idx = {r
′
α, r
′
β} (11)
(r′α ∈ (Z
∗
p)
h, r′β ∈ (Z
∗
p)
w; they are random vectors) as an additional parame-
ter. R′idx is required (in addition to R
(n)
idx) to compute the cyclic convolution
Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ , as explained later in detail. R
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N) and R
′
idx are stored in
a client or a parameter management server [41]. Fig. 4 shows X
(n)
idx , Yidx, R
(n)
idx,
and R′idx. In the following, we describe the proposed algorithm in the individual
parameter scenario, where R
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N) and R
′
idx are independently and
uniformly generated. The algorithm below can easily be extended to the com-
mon parameter scenario by setting R∗idx = R
(1)
idx = · · · = R
(N)
idx and using R
∗
idx
as a common parameter (R′idx is also used in the common parameter scenario
in the same way as the individual parameter scenario).
Fig. 5 shows the process of the proposed indexing scheme in the enroll-
ment/authentication phase. In the enrollment phase, the proposed indexing
scheme performs the following process:
1. Compute transformed indexes T
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N) from X
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N),
R
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N), and R
′
idx as follows:
T
(n)
idx =
{
{t
(1)
αi , t
(1)
βi , t
′
α, t
′
β |1 ≤ i ≤ k} (if n = 1)
{t
(n)
αi , t
(n)
βi |1 ≤ i ≤ k} (if 2 ≤ n ≤ N),
(12)
where
t
(n)
αi = G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ r
(n)
αi (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (13)
t
(n)
βi = G(x
(n)
βi ) ◦ r
(n)
βi (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (14)
t′α = G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ r
′
α (15)
t′β = G(x
(1)
β1 ) ◦ r
′
β (16)
and G denotes the 1D NTT.
2. Store the transformed indexes {T
(n)
idx |1 ≤ n ≤ N} in the database of the
authentication server (along with the transformed templates {T (n)|1 ≤
n ≤ N}).
In the step 1, we compute t
(n)
αi (resp. t
(n)
βi ) in (13) (resp. (14)) by transforming
x
(n)
αi (resp. (x
(n)
βi )) via the 1D NTT and filtering r
(n)
αi (resp. r
(n)
βi ). We also
compute t′α (resp. t
′
β) in (15) (resp. (16)) by filtering an additional parameter
r′α (resp. r
′
β). The size of {T
(n)
idx |1 ≤ n ≤ N} is (h+ w)(kn+ 1) pixels in total.
In the authentication phase, the proposed scheme performs the following
process:
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Figure 5: Proposed indexing scheme (G: 1D NTT, M (n) (= Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ ): approx-
imation of X(n) ⋆ Y ).
1. Compute transformed indexes V
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N) from Yidx, R
(n)
idx (1 ≤
n ≤ N), and R′idx as follows:
V
(n)
idx
=
{
{v
(1)
αi , v
(1)
βi , v
′
αj , v
′
βj |1 ≤ i ≤ k, 2 ≤ j ≤ k} (if n = 1)
{v
(n)
αi , v
(n)
βi |1 ≤ i ≤ k} (if 2 ≤ n ≤ N),
(17)
where
v
(n)
αi = G(
←−yαi) ◦ (r
(n)
αi )
−1 (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (18)
v
(n)
βi = G(
←−yβi) ◦ (r
(n)
βi )
−1 (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (19)
v′αj = G(
←−yαj) ◦ (r
′
α)
−1 (2 ≤ j ≤ k) (20)
v′βj = G(
←−yαj) ◦ (r
′
β)
−1 (2 ≤ j ≤ k) (21)
and ←−y is a flipped vector of y (i.e., ←−yαi[j] = yαi[h − j − 1],
←−yβi[j] =
yβi[w − j − 1]).
2. Compute matrices M
(n)
α ∈ Zh×k
2
p and M
(n)
β ∈ Z
w×k2
p (1 ≤ n ≤ N), which
are given by
M (n)α = [G
−1(G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαj))]1≤i,j≤k (22)
M
(n)
β = [G
−1(G(x
(n)
βi ) ◦ G(
←−yβj))]1≤i,j≤k, (23)
where G−1 is the 1D inverse NTT and [a]1≤i,j≤k is a matrix of k
2 columns,
whose ((i − 1)k + j)-th column is given by a. We can compute M
(n)
α and
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M
(n)
β from T
(n)
idx and V
(n)
idx via minimum spanning trees, as described in
Section 3.3.
3. Compute the following matrix M (n) ∈ Zh×wp (1 ≤ n ≤ N):
M (n) =M (n)α M
(n)T
β . (24)
As we prove later, M (n) = Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ (Section 3.4, Theorem 1). In other
words, M (n) approximates the cross-correlation X(n) ⋆ Y , and therefore
we can compute an approximate score sˆ(X(n), Y ) based on M (n).
Note that the number of the 1D inverse NTTs necessary to computeM
(n)
α
in (22) is k2. Similarly, the number of the 1D inverse NTTs necessary
to compute M
(n)
β in (23) is k
2. Thus, the total number of the 1D inverse
NTTs necessary to compute M (n) is 2k2, which is much smaller than that
in CIRF (i.e., 2k2 ≪ h+ w) when k is very small.
4. Sort N transformed templates in ascending (or descending) order of the
approximate distance (or similarity) sˆ(X(n), Y ).
Then, the proposed scheme computes an exact score s(X(n), Y ) based on X(n) ⋆
Y according to the sorted order. If the exact distance (or similarity) s(X(n), Y )
falls below (or exceeds) a threshold (i.e., if a genuine template is found), it
identifies the user as the corresponding enrollee and terminates the identification
process. If a genuine template is not found after matching all the templates, it
rejects the user.
3.3 Computation of M
(n)
α and M
(n)
β via minimum spanning
trees
We now explain how to compute M
(n)
α and M
(n)
β (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in (22) and (23)
using the transformed indexes T
(n)
idx and V
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N), which are given
by (12) and (17), respectively. We begin by explaining how to compute M
(n)
α
(1 ≤ n ≤ N) in detail (since M
(n)
β can be computed in the same way as M
(n)
α ).
First, we compute
t
(n)
αi ◦ v
(n)
αi = G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαi) (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (25)
t′α ◦ v
′
αj = G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ G(
←−yαj) (2 ≤ j ≤ k) (26)
using T
(n)
idx and V
(n)
idx (see (13), (15), (18), and (20)). It is important to note
that (25) and (26) form a minimum spanning tree [36], whose vertices represent
G(x
(n)
αi ) and G(
←−yαi) (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k), and whose edges represent their
Hadamard products. Fig. 6 shows the minimum spanning tree formed from (25)
and (26) in the case where k = 3.
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Figure 6: Minimum spanning tree formed from the equations (25) and (26)
(k = 3). Solid (resp. dash) lines represent the Hadamard products in (25)
(resp. (26)).
We compute
{G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαj))|1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k} (27)
using the minimum spanning tree. Specifically, we compute the Hadamard
product of G(x
(n)
αi ) and G(
←−yαj) (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k) other than (25) and
(26) by tracking the path from G(x
(n)
αi ) to G(
←−yαj) via G(
←−yαi) and G(x
(1)
α1 ). In
other words, we compute G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαj) using (25) and (26) as follows:
G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαj)
= (G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαi)) ◦ (G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ G(
←−yαi))
−1 ◦ (G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ G(
←−yαj)). (28)
For example, we compute G(x
(n)
α2 ) ◦ G(
←−yα3) in Fig. 6 by tracking the path from
G(x
(n)
α2 ) to G(
←−yα3) via G(
←−yα2) and G(x
(1)
α1 ): G(x
(n)
α2 )◦G(
←−yα3) = (G(x
(n)
α2 )◦G(
←−yα2))◦
(G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ G(
←−yα2))
−1 ◦ (G(x
(1)
α1 ) ◦ G(
←−yα3)). After computing (27) in this manner,
we compute M
(n)
α (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in (22) via the 1D inverse NTTs.
Similarly, we compute M
(n)
β (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in (23) using the minimum span-
ning tree. Specifically, we compute
t
(n)
βi ◦ v
(n)
βi = G(x
(n)
βi ) ◦ G(
←−yβi) (1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) (29)
t′β ◦ v
′
βj = G(x
(1)
β1 ) ◦ G(
←−yβj) (2 ≤ j ≤ k) (30)
using T
(n)
idx and V
(n)
idx (see (14), (16), (19), and (21)), and compute
{G(x
(n)
βi ) ◦ G(
←−yβj))|1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k} (31)
using a minimum spanning tree formed from (29) and (30). After computing
(31), we compute M
(n)
β (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in (23) via the 1D inverse NTTs.
The total number of the Hadamard products necessary to compute (27) and
(31) is quadratic in the number of k. However, in our experiments in Section 4,
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we confirmed that the time to compute all of the Hadamard products was much
less than the time to compute all of the 1D inverse NTTs.
3.4 Theoretical properties
We show some theoretical properties of the proposed indexing scheme. We begin
with the following theorem:
Theorem 1.
M (n) = Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ (1 ≤ n ≤ N). (32)
The proof is given in B. Theorem 1 means that M (n) approximates X(n) ⋆
Y . By sorting transformed templates in ascending (or descending) order of an
approximate distance (or similarity) sˆ(X(n), Y ) based on M (n), we can find a
genuine template in the early stage of exact matching.
We then consider the security of the proposed indexing scheme against At-
tackers A, B, and C in Section 2.3. We assume that these attackers obtain
transformed indexes in addition to transformed features, as described in Sec-
tion 2.3. Let T all = {T (n)|1 ≤ n ≤ N} and T allidx = {T
(n)
idx |1 ≤ n ≤ N} be sets of
N transformed templates and N transformed indexes, respectively. Attacker
A obtains T (n) and T
(n)
idx . whereas Attacker B obtains T
all and T allidx. Let
further V all = {V (n)|1 ≤ n ≤ N} and V allidx = {V
(n)
idx |1 ≤ n ≤ N} be sets of N
transformed query samples and N transformed indexes, respectively. Attacker
C obtains T all, T allidx, V
all, and V allidx. Table 1 summarizes the information avail-
able to each attacher.
Let Xidx, Tidx, T
all, and Tallidx be spaces of X
(n)
idx , T
(n), T all, and T allidx,
respectively. We firstly consider Attacker A:
Theorem 2. For any X(n) ∈ X, X
(n)
idx ∈ Xidx, T
(n) ∈ T, and T
(n)
idx ∈ Tidx,
Pr(X(n)|T (n), T
(n)
idx ) = Pr(X
(n)) (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (33)
Pr(X
(n)
idx |T
(n), T
(n)
idx ) = Pr(X
(n)
idx) (1 ≤ n ≤ N). (34)
The proof is given in C. Theorem 2 means that the n-th transformed
template T (n) and the n-th transformed index T
(n)
idx leak no information about
the original transformed template X(n) and the original index X
(n)
idx . In other
words, the proposed scheme has perfect secrecy against Attacker A. Note that
this theorem holds for both the individual parameter scenario and the common
parameter scenario.
We secondly consider Attacker B in the individual parameter scenario.
Since parameters R(n) (1 ≤ n ≤ N), R
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N), and R
′
idx are indepen-
dent in the individual parameter scenario, the following theorem is immediately
derived from Threorem 2:
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Theorem 3. In the individual parameter scenario, for any X(n) ∈ X, X
(n)
idx ∈
Xidx, T
all ∈ Tall, and T allidx ∈ T
all,
Pr(X(n)|T all, T allidx) = Pr(X
(n)) (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (35)
Pr(X
(n)
idx |T
all, T allidx) = Pr(X
(n)
idx) (1 ≤ n ≤ N). (36)
Theorem 3 means that the proposed scheme has perfect secrecy against
Attacker B in the individual parameter scenario.
We thirdly consider Attacker C in the individual parameter scenario. In
this case, T (n) = F(X(n))◦R(n) and V (n) = F(
←−
Y )◦ (R(n))−1. In addition, T
(n)
idx
and V
(n)
idx are decomposed into (13)-(16) and (18)-(21), respectively. Thus, the
information available to Attacker C is the following system of equations:

T (n) = F(X(n)) ◦R(n) (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (37)
V (n) = F(
←−
Y ) ◦ (R(n))−1 (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (38)
equations (13)-(16) (39)
equations (18)-(21), (40)
which is equivalent to the following system of equations:

T (n) = F(X(n)) ◦R(n) (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (41)
F (−1)(T (n) ◦ V (n)) = X(n) ⋆ Y (1 ≤ n ≤ N) (42)
equations (13)-(16) (43)
equations (25), (26), (29), and (30) (44)
((42) is obtained by multiplying (37) by (38) and performing the 2D inverse
NTT; (44) is obtained by multiplying (39) by (40)). From Theorem 3, (41)
and (43) provide no information about X(n) and X
(n)
idx (1 ≤ n ≤ N). Thus, the
only information available to Attacker C is (42) and (44), which are necessary
to compute scores s(X(n), Y ) (1 ≤ n ≤ N) and approximate scores sˆ(X(n), Y )
(1 ≤ n ≤ N), respectively.
We now consider an attack that tries to recover X(n), Y , X
(n)
idx , and Yidx by
solving (42) and (44). (42) is a system of quadratic simultaneous equations with
(N+1)hw unknown variables (i.e., X(1), · · · , X(N), and Y ) and Nhw equations.
(44) is a system of quadratic simultaneous equations with (Nk + k)(h + w)
unknown variables (i.e., X
(1)
idx, · · · , X
(N)
idx , and Yidx) and (Nk + k − 1)(h + w)
equations. Thus, the number of unknown variables is larger than the number
of equations in both (42) and (44), and it is hard to recover X(n), Y , X
(n)
idx , and
Yidx from these equations.
We also consider the security of the proposed scheme against Attackers
B and C in the common parameter scenario where R∗ = R(1) = · · · = R(N)
and R∗idx = R
(1)
idx = · · · = R
(N)
idx . In this case, the system of equations (37) and
(38) are quadratic simultaneous equations with (N + 2)hw unknown variables
(i.e., X(1), · · · , X(N), Y , and R∗) and (N + 1)hw equations. Similarly, the
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Table 1: Information available to Attackers A, B, and C.
Attacker A Attacker B Attacker C
T (n), T
(n)
idx T
all, T allidx T
all, T allidx, V
all, V allidx
Table 2: Security of the proposed indexing scheme (A: Attacker A, B: At-
tacker B, C: Attacker C, #unknown: the number of unknown variables).
individual parameter common parameter
A perfect secrecy perfect secrecy
B perfect secrecy #unknown > #equations
C #unknown > #equations #unknown > #equations
system of equations (39) and (40) are quadratic simultaneous equations with
(Nk + 2k + 1)(h+ w) unknown variables (i.e., X
(1)
idx, · · · , X
(N)
idx , Yidx, R
∗
idx, and
R′idx) and (Nk+2k)(h+w) equations. Thus, the number of unknown variables
is also larger than the number of equations in this case. Therefore, it is hard
for Attacker C to recover X(n), Y , X
(n)
idx , and Yidx from these equations. Since
Attacker B does not obtain the equations (38) and (40), it is harder for her to
recover the original data.
Table 2 summarizes the security of the proposed scheme. The proposed
scheme also has the diversity and the revocability in the same way as CIRF
described in Section 2.4 (since we can prove them in the same way as CIRF, we
omit the proof).
We finally discuss the communication cost. Assume that we use the cross-
correlations X(n) ⋆ Y and Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ as an exact score s(X(n), Y ) and an ap-
proximate score sˆ(X(n), Y ), respectively. In the individual parameter scenario,
the client (or the parameter management server) needs to send N transformed
query samples V all = {V (n)|1 ≤ n ≤ N} and N transformed indexes V allidx =
{V
(n)
idx |1 ≤ n ≤ N}, whose size is Nhw + (Nk + k − 1)(h + w) pixels in total.
In the common parameter scenario, the size is reduced to hw+ (2k− 1)(h+w)
pixels.
For example, if each pixel is represented as a short integer, h = 32, w =
64, k = 2 (as in our experiments), and N = 32000, then the total sizes in
the individual parameter scenario and the common parameter scenario are 143
megabytes and 4672 bytes, respectively. If we can use the 100 Gigabit Ethernet
private line, the communication cost does not matter even in the individual
parameter scenario. The 400 Gigabit Ethernet will also be available in the near
future. In such cases, we should use an individual parameter, since it has perfect
secrecy against Attacker B. If we cannot use such a high-speed Ethernet and
the communication cost is a major problem in the individual parameter scenario,
we should use a common parameter.
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4 Experimental evaluation
4.1 Experimental set-up
We evaluated the proposed indexing scheme using the finger-vein dataset in
[47], which includes six fingers (index fingers, middle fingers, and ring fingers
of both hands) from 505 subjects. We used this dataset because it includes
more subjects than other finger-vein datasets [19, 43, 48]. To further increase
the number of subjects, we assumed that index, middle, and ring fingers are
presented by different users. In other words, we assumed that the dataset in [47]
includes two fingers (left finger and right finger) from each of 1515 subjects. We
used two images per finger (one for enrollment and the other for authentication),
and excluded 32 subjects whose fingers were not appropriately captured. In
total, we used two fingers (left finger and right finger) from 1483 (= 1515− 32)
subjects.
We extracted a finger-vein pattern from each finger-vein image using the
feature extraction method in [25], and transformed it into a binary image (h =
32, w = 64; each pixel takes 1 (vein) or 0 (background)). We set maximum
allowable shift lengths (∆imax, ∆jmax) in computing X
(n) ⋆ Y and M (n) (=
Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ ) as (∆imax, ∆jmax) = (6, 12) and (2, 4), respectively (we confirmed
that these values provided high accuracy). We then set zero values for the
uppermost ∆imax pixels, lowermost ∆imax pixels, leftmost ∆jmax pixels, and
rightmost ∆jmax pixels of each enrolled image (e.g., zero-padding) to use cyclic
cross-correlation. As an exact score s(X(n), Y ), we computed the minimum of
the Hamming distances of overlapped binary images via CIRF (see A for how to
compute the minimum Hamming distance via CIRF). We used (not the cross-
correlation X(n) ⋆ Y but) the minimum Hamming distance as an exact score,
because it provided higher identification accuracy than X(n) ⋆ Y . Regarding p,
α, and β in (2), we set p = 8641, α = 40, and β = 948, respectively.
We assumed that all templates of 1483 users are enrolled in the authenti-
cation server (the number of templates is N = 2966). Then we performed an
experiment, where each user inputs left and right fingers and the system iden-
tifies the user. It should be noted here that FAR in identification (the error
rate that an non-enrollee is accepted as an enrollee) increases as the number
of enrollees increases [2]. To achieve high accuracy, we integrated, for each en-
rollee, two exact scores from left and right fingers (i.e., score level fusion [2]).
As a fusion scheme, we used a sum rule, which sums up the two scores, since
this rule is equivalent to logistic regression [27, 29] using the same regression
coefficients for the two fingers (the effectiveness of logistic regression has been
shown in score level fusion [27, 29]). We evaluated EER (Equal Error Rate; the
operating point where FAR equals to FRR [2]) in the case where the system
identifies the user by computing all 2966 exact scores (i.e., the system does not
use an indexing scheme) using 1483 × 1483 integrated scores. The result was
EER = 2.0× 10−3.
Using the proposed indexing scheme described in Section 3, we computed
two approximate scores for each enrollee. Specifically, we computed M (n) (=
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Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ ) in (24), and directly used it as an approximate score sˆ(X(n), Y ); i.e.,
sˆ(X(n), Y ) = M (n). Then we integrated the two approximate scores using the
sum rule, and sorted 1483 enrollees by the integrated approximate scores. Here
we used BMF in [50] as a factorization method, and set the rank k to k = 1 or
2. Then we computed two exact scores for each of the enrollees according to
the sorted order, and integrated the two exact scores using the sum rule. When
the integrated exact score (i.e., the sum of the Hamming distances) fell below a
threshold, we identified the user as the corresponding enrollee and terminated
the identification process.
We also compared the proposed indexing scheme with an existing indexing
scheme. Specifically, we focused on the fact that one of the most popular in-
dexing schemes was based on LSH (Locality Sensitive Hashing) [7, 20, 37, 42],
which computes l k-bit hashes for each biometric feature as an index. The
LSH-based indexing scheme for finger-vein identification was also proposed in
[42]. However, since LSH is only applicable for specific distance measures (e.g.,
Hamming distance, Lp distance), it requires the alignment of two images in
finger-vein identification. Although the study in [42] assumed that the image
alignment is successfully performed, the image alignment is difficult especially
in the case of template protection (since the original template is not available).
Taking this into account, we evaluated DBH (Distance-based Hashing) [1], which
is a variant of LSH that can be applied to arbitrary distance measures. DBH
can be applied to finger-vein identification without requiring image alignment,
and significantly outperforms VP-trees, a well-known distance-based indexing
method [1]. Therefore, we consider DBH is a good candidate for comparison
(we do not explain the algorithm for DBH in this paper; see [1] for details). We
randomly selected 100 templates (from 2966 templates) to construct hash func-
tions (in the same way as [1]), and attempted various values for the parameters
k and l from 1 to 1000. Note that DBH does not protect the original index (and
therefore cannot be used for biometric identification over networks), unlike the
proposed scheme. Nonetheless, it is important to evaluate DBH, since it shows
how efficient the proposed scheme is compared to the existing indexing scheme.
4.2 Experimental results
We first fixed the number of exact score computations N ′ (≤ 2966), and evalu-
ated a hit rate, a percentage of the cases in which the first N ′ templates include
a genuine template. The left panel of Fig. 7 shows the relationship between N ′
and the hit rate. For DBH, we show the best performance obtained by chang-
ing k and l for various values from 1 to 1000. It can be seen that the proposed
indexing scheme outperforms DBH. We emphasize again that DBH does not
protect the original index. The proposed scheme protects the original index, as
discussed in Section 3.4, and provides a higher hit rate than DBH.
To investigate how the hit rate changes by integrating two approximate
scores, we also evaluated the hit rate of the proposed scheme in the case where
each user inputs only a left or right finger. The right panel of Fig. 7 shows
the relationship between the number of selected enrollees M ′ (≤ 1483), whose
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Figure 7: Hit rate [%]. L and R in the right panel represent the case when a
user inputs only a left finger or a right finger, respectively.
Table 3: Average Number of exact score computations N ′ necessary to find a
genuine template (i.e., to terminate the identification process) [%].
DBH Proposal (k = 1) Proposal (k = 2)
N ′ 526.3 391.7 164.7
exact scores have been computed, and the hit rate. It can be seen that the
hit rate is improved by integrating two approximate scores. This is because
approximate scores are highly correlated with exact distances. In other words,
the discriminative power of approximate scores can be improved by score level
fusion (in the same way as exact scores).
We then evaluated the average number of exact score computations N ′ nec-
essary to find a genuine template (i.e., to terminate the identification process).
Table 3 shows the results. In the proposed scheme with rank k = 2, N ′ was
164.7, which is about one-eighteenth of the number of enrollees N (= 2966). We
also measured the time to compute one exact score and one approximate score
in the proposed scheme with k = 2 on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v3 (2.40
GHz, 6 cores) with 32 GB RAM. The results were 0.28 ms and 0.015 ms, re-
spectively. For example, if the number of templates is N = 32000, it takes about
9 (≈ 0.28 × 10−3 × 32000) seconds to identify a user in the original CIRF. By
using the proposed scheme with k = 2, the identification time can be reduced
to about one (≈ 0.015 × 10−3 × 32000 + 0.28×10
−3×32000
18 ) second on average.
Note that the proposed scheme can significantly reduce the average identifica-
tion time without affecting the identification accuracy (i.e., EER remains to be
2.0× 10−3), since it computes exact scores until a genuine template is found.
By combining these experimental results with the discussions in Section 3.4,
we conclude that the proposed indexing scheme is promising with regard to the
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properties (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v) in Section 2.3 in this dataset.
However, it should be noted that the rank-2 approximation may not be
sufficient for other applications. For example, Hearn and Reichel [13] showed
that the rank-3 approximation was necessary to detect all planes or all spots
in cells via FFT-based convolution. The quality of fingerprint images can be
poor when we use the singular value decomposition (SVD) with rank 1 or 2 [6].
As future work, we would like to evaluate the proposed indexing method using
other biometric traits such as fingerprint, face, and iris. We would also like to
improve the proposed indexing scheme so that the number of the 1D inverse
NTTs is (not O(k2) but) O(k) to extend its applicability.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a cancelable indexing scheme based on low-rank ap-
proximation of CIRF. We proved that the transformed index leaks no informa-
tion about the original biometric feature and the original index, and thoroughly
discussed the security of the proposed scheme. We also demonstrated that the
proposed scheme outperforms DBH [1], which is a variant of LSH that can be
applied to finger-vein identification, and significantly reduces the one-to-many
matching time.
A Computation of the minimum Hamming dis-
tance via CIRF
We explain how to compute the minimum of the Hamming distances of over-
lapped binary images (over all values of ∆i and ∆j) via CIRF. Let X¯ and Y¯
be binary images that flip 0 and 1 in each pixel of a template X and a query
sample Y , respectively. At the enrollment phase, we randomly and indepen-
dently generate two parameters R1 and R2, and transform X and X¯ as follows:
T = FR1(X), T¯ = FR2(X¯). Then we store T and T¯ in the authentication server.
At the authentication phase, we transform Y and Y¯ as follows: V = GR2(Y ),
V¯ = GR1(Y¯ ). Then we send V and V¯ to the authentication server. We compute
the minimum Hamming distance s(X,Y ) between X and Y from T , T¯ , V , and
V¯ via CIRF as follows:
s(X,Y ) = min
∆i,∆j
((X¯ ⋆ Y )[∆i,∆j] + (X ⋆ Y¯ )[∆i,∆j]). (45)
We need to compute X¯ ⋆ Y and X ⋆ Y¯ to obtain s(X,Y ) in (45). Therefore, the
computation of s(X,Y ) requires two 2D inverse NTTs (i.e., 2(h+w) 1D inverse
NTTs) in total.
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B Proof of Theorem 1
M (n) =M (n)α M
(n)T
β (46)
=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
F−1((G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(
←−yαj))(G(x
(n)
βi ) ◦ G(
←−yβj))
T ) (47)
=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
F−1((G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(x
(n)
βi )
T )(G(←−yαj) ◦ G(
←−yβj))
T ) (48)
= F−1(
k∑
i=1
(G(x
(n)
αi ) ◦ G(x
(n)
βi )
T )(
k∑
j=1
G(←−yαj) ◦ G(
←−yβj)
T )) (49)
= F−1(
k∑
i=1
(F(x
(n)
αi x
(n)T
βi ))(
k∑
j=1
F(←−yαj
←−yβj
T ))) (50)
= F−1(F(
k∑
i=1
x
(n)
αi x
(n)T
βi )(F(
k∑
j=1
←−yαj
←−yβj
T ))) = Xˆ(n) ⋆ Yˆ (51)
From (48) to (49) and from (50) to (51), we used the linearity of the NTT. From
(46) to (47) and from (49) to (50), we used the separability theorem [24] for the
NTT.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Here we provide an outline of the proof of (33) and (34) in the case where n = 1
(we can prove (33) and (34) in the case where 2 ≤ n ≤ N in the same way as
the case where n = 1). We also assume that all elements in G(x
(1)
αi ) and G(x
(1)
βi )
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) are non-zero (we can extend our proof to the case in which they can
include zero elements in the same way as [39]).
We first prove that Pr(X
(1)
idx|T
(1)
idx) = Pr(X
(1)
idx) for any X
(1)
idx and any T
(1)
idx.
This equation holds if there is exactly one parameter pair (R
(1)
idx, R
′
idx) for any
X
(1)
idx and any T
(1)
idx (Lemma 1 in [40]). By (13)-(16), there is exactly one
such parameter pair (R
(1)
idx, R
′
idx): r
(1)
αi = t
(1)
αi /G(x
(1)
αi ), r
(1)
βi = t
(1)
βi /G(x
(1)
βi ), r
′
α =
t′α/G(x
(1)
α1 ), and r
′
β = t
′
β/G(x
(1)
β1 ). Then, since T
(1)
idx → X
(1)
idx → X
(1) (i.e., T
(1)
idx,
X
(1)
idx, and X
(1) form a Markov chain), Pr(X(1)|T
(1)
idx) = Pr(X
(1)) for any X(1)
and any T
(1)
idx (we can derive this using Bayes’ theorem).
Similarly, Pr(X(1)|T (1)) = Pr(X(1)) for any X(1) and any T (1) (as described
in Section 2.4). Then, since T (1) → X(1) → X
(1)
idx, Pr(X
(1)
idx|T
(1)) = Pr(X
(1)
idx) for
any X
(1)
idx and any T
(1). Thus, both T
(1)
idx and T
(1) leak no information about
X
(1)
idx and X
(1), and therefore (33) and (34) hold (we can derive (33) and (34)
from the above equations using Bayes’ theorem).
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